<translation>Open call from experts to the representatives of the city of Brno regarding the reconstruction of ŽUB</translation>

Dear City Council Members of Brno,
 
We address you as a group of experts who have been monitoring the development of the railway node reconstruction project in Brno for some time and are familiar not only with the specific topic but also with the general issues concerning cities and transportation. We do not want to present our expert opinion on the specific solution and the location of the future Brno train station here; rather, we wish to draw your attention to a number of serious deficiencies and problems associated with the currently ongoing decision-making process regarding the future form of the railway node and the entire city of Brno. Our open letter is quite extensive, but it is necessary to enumerate all significant procedural and substantive shortcomings and the resulting threats for the future that we perceive in the current process, which is evidently proceeding too hastily, and for which the city of Brno may pay a price.
 
Summary:
Contrary to the coalition agreement and the feasibility study, which places great emphasis on consensus regarding the ŽUB project, there is no serious open debate on this subject. The reconstruction option is chosen in advance without any public participation.
The City Architect's Office argues purposefully and convolutedly.
The City Architect's Office bases its choice for the River option on strongly debatable, unprovable, minimally relevant, or false arguments while ignoring the truly key ones.
The city leadership does not respect public opinion and informs the public inadequately and unilaterally.
The city-preferred River option requires a fundamental reorganization of public transportation, and it is already known that some of its critical transport infrastructure will not be built on time (or at all). Nevertheless, alternative solutions are unknown.
The risks of the unified railway corridor in the River option are underestimated.
 
SERIOUS PROFESSIONAL DISCUSSION WITH PUBLIC PARTICIPATION?
 
We see a fundamental problem in the absence of a genuinely open expert debate on the given topic; instead, we are witnessing an internal decision by the City Architect's Office, which is subsequently presented only in meetings with citizens. Substantive discussion is merely simulated; the city does not represent the expert opinion of the other side, the public has limited space, and responses are often not entirely comprehensible, vague, and incomplete. Presentations are progressively modified as factual inaccuracies in the arguments for the predetermined option are uncovered. The conclusions of the feasibility study are conveyed entirely incomprehensibly through further calculations, the essence of which is not explained, conjuring an unintended impression of the intention to confuse the public rather than clarify the complicated issues.
 
This is in stark contrast to the recommendation of the feasibility study, which, given the sensitivity of the topic, emphasizes the need for supporting consensus and good communication: “The greatest project risks can be unequivocally identified as the insufficient political support for the project, public disagreement with the project's solution, and changes in professional, political, and societal demands on the project. ... It is therefore absolutely essential that a suitable communication campaign be conducted by the City of Brno among the political and professional bodies of the city with adequate public involvement in order to agree on the final solution for the ŽUB and on the necessary steps and guarantees leading to its successful realization.” Unfortunately, it must be stated that nothing of the sort has occurred or is occurring, and a telling reminder is the Mayor's reference to the alleged lack of public awareness, on the basis of which the city leadership has rejected the result of a public opinion survey commissioned by the city. It is indisputable that it was the city's duty to inform its citizens, which has not been done. We note that the commitment to a serious expert discussion with public participation is included in the coalition agreement.
 
WHERE WILL THE STATION BE?
 
A second problem is the obvious purposefulness of the conclusions presented by the City Architect's Office. In the initial presentations from the City Architect's Office, the suspicious clarity of the conclusions contrasted with the ambiguity of the results of the feasibility study. Later, the presentation was adjusted in response to criticisms from the professional public; however, discrepancies remain, giving the impression of data manipulation in favor of the predetermined option. For example, the higher costs of the Petrov option are repeatedly mentioned when including the high-speed rail (VRT), but it is not taken into account that a southern entry for the VRT is not ruled out for Petrov either. It presents incomprehensible and unjustified recalculations of extended travel times for all residents in percentages without showing the real change in travel times from individual locations in minutes. We consider such data irrelevant or purpose-driven. Investment differences in urban infrastructure are minimized for options A and B without sufficient explanation of why, and especially the fact that the station in the Petrov variant would be situated at a currently functional public transport hub and that the new infrastructure accounted for in the zoning plan is not conditional, unlike the River option, is completely overlooked. In initial presentations, the least favorable sub-options were evidently intentionally compared to maximize the disadvantage for Petrov. Only after justified reproaches was this "tactic" partially abandoned. The City Architect's Office has also not produced any official document in which its considerations are seriously justified and which could serve as a basis for further discussion.
 
As main arguments for the River option, the City Architect's Office generally cites highly debatable facts, the issues of which are outlined below. Such arguments certainly should not be the ones that decide the location of the future train station, in our opinion.
 
FASTEST - 10 YEARS EARLIER
 
The argument of faster construction for the River option (relative to a specific year) was already presented in 2002, assuming the completion of the relocated station in 2012. How can such weight be given to an argument based on such uncertain assumptions? Moreover, for a project expected to take decades, possibly centuries? The City Architect's Office also openly extends the time difference between the individual options to the detriment of Petrov without adequately explaining why. Both options require securing financial resources, and it is highly unlikely that these can be obtained specifically by 2020, just as it is not guaranteed that a project for the River can begin before the expiration of the zoning plan (2022), which is one of the arguments for this option. Just like in the Petrov case, a threat exists regarding discrepancies with the zoning plan; the dangers of the River have been witnessed repeatedly for many years - unilateral promotion, poor preparation, politicization, and subsequent resistance from the public, currently with an invalid zoning decision. Why should we be optimistic about this now?
 
MINIMAL IMPACTS
 
Similarly, regarding another of the main arguments, which is the impacts on the city during construction. Why is this argument chosen as key when it will affect travel for a few years for a project that will last generations? On the contrary, we find the issue of organizing public transport crucial, which is not only missing among the key arguments but is almost never discussed at the debates. While fears about disruptions, although given the most emphasis, are not specified in detail, significant differences exist between the ways of interruptions for the individual options, where construction for Petrov occurs primarily on existing railway areas with lesser impacts on the functionality of public transport, while at the River, construction activity affects existing streets much more due to the need for new infrastructure (so-called embedded abandoned - large city ring road, new urban thoroughfare). The solution for goods transport during the construction of the new station "from scratch," which is actually the current freight station, seems to be entirely overlooked. We completely disagree with the City Architect's assertion that these differences are negligible.
 
LEAST EXPENSIVE
 
Although the feasibility study indicates an approximately 11% difference (CZK 4.7 billion without accounting for VRT) in investment costs to the state in favor of the River for optimal variants (with the highest economic benefits - variants A and B1b), the situation for the City of Brno indicates approximately three times higher costs for the River option compared to Petrov (a difference of CZK 1.4 billion). The same difference also appears in operational costs for the city of Brno during the monitored period, thus CZK 1.4 billion higher for the River variant. In the assessment of total economic benefits, the Petrov variant performs significantly better (with an 8 billion CZK difference over the monitored period). We quote from the feasibility study: “Variant A presents the least traffic restrictions during the project’s construction; however, it generates overall lower economic benefits compared to variant B. The reason is primarily the low savings in perceived travel time in personal transport and higher costs of operating public transportation.”
 
The Petrov variant thus entails CZK 4.7 billion higher investment costs (to the state) but generates CZK 8 billion more in total economic benefits. For the city of Brno, the situation is clearer - both investment and operational costs are unequivocally savings with the Petrov variant. (We would like to remind that the ruling coalition committed in the coalition agreement to support an option that will minimize the budgetary costs of the city of Brno.)
 
How did the City Architect's Office arrive at the conclusion that the River is cheaper based on this data? Cheaper for whom is this option? It appears that the City Architect's Office is surprisingly defending state interests at the expense of the city, and only in the short term at that. However, this city institution also presents a graph indicating that the return on investment for the Petrov variant only starts after 2080. It is not entirely clear whether this is supposed to refer to city or state investments; however, the calculation is explained through prolonged travel times attributed to unspecified disruptions in the Petrov variant during construction. This entirely opaque calculation, contradicting the conclusions of the feasibility study, cannot instill confidence in us and cannot stand as an argument in the presented form.
 
CITY DEVELOPMENT
 
The City Architect's Office originally presented outdated data from before 2015 indicating an almost double possible utilization of the so-called southern center in the River variant. After they corrected this figure, the argument of the railway body as a barrier to development remains. As we see from numerous foreign examples and as clearly demonstrated by the Future of the Center of Brno competition dealing with this issue, a modern station does not represent an obstacle to the development of the so-called southern center; on the contrary. Moreover, the barrier here is not only the railway body and the station itself, which, in the reconstructed form, is crossed by numerous generous passages that remind nothing of today's "mouse hole," but also the topographical differences that remain even in the River variant and that will need to be overcome in both variants.
 
We dare to say that we see the problem of developing the area of today’s rail yard more in the River variant, as while in the Petrov variant, this neighborhood could develop naturally and gradually, allowing for timely creation of tools to secure the construction of a quality, vibrant urban neighborhood, in the River case, rapid construction is anticipated to quickly fill the heavily trafficked empty space between the center and the new station. There are no domestic examples demonstrating the ability to quickly and simultaneously build a new urban ensemble of this magnitude. Quite the opposite, negative examples exist, including from Brno itself. The City of Brno has not been able, over several decades, to ensure a suitable connection with the bus station; it has taken 12 years to reroute a tram line to an adjacent street. Over the past 20 years, the growing construction does not correspond at all to the declared vibrant city; rather, it comprises mono-functional office and shopping buildings bordered by transport channels, entirely lifeless outside of business hours. Therefore, we remain strongly skeptical about the proclaimed quick and high-quality construction of the so-called southern center, and we advise very cautious and gradual development without any compulsion.
 
HIGH-SPEED TRAINS
 
The feasibility study and, thus, the City Architect's Office anticipate the entry of the high-speed rail into the main station via tunnels from the north and south in the Petrov option and via a switch from the south in the River variant. We would like to point out that these are mere assumptions without any guarantees. At this point, we do not know whether or when the high-speed rail will be realized, whether the state might favor a southern connection in the Petrov variant, or vice versa, or whether the route of the high-speed rail might follow an entirely different path. What we know is that the travel time will likely be decisive, where the switch connection (River) is at a disadvantage. Therefore, it seems entirely inappropriate to base the costly routing argument for making decisions about the station's location on this specific argument, which clearly needs to be addressed before the high-speed rail routing is specified. The KAM presentations do not mention that Petrov allows for the entry of high-speed rail from the north and south, nor that the River option implies delays due to the turn that may rule out this routing. We can thus even state that KAM's argument in favor of the River actually works against this variant.
 
CONNECTIVITY TO PUBLIC TRANSPORT
 
Besides the aforementioned unconvincing arguments upon which KAM bases its preference for the River variant, we must point out additional problematic points in its presentation. As mentioned, KAM's presentations surprisingly mostly overlook one key problem of the ŽUB reconstruction, which we consider crucial, namely the connectivity to public transportation. While the feasibility study considers, based on the zoning plan, certain transport infrastructure constructions in both variants, it is quite evident that the Petrov variant, due to its location at an existing transport hub, is not dependent on these constructions as the River option is. Unlike the River option, these can be gradually completed or possibly not at all. KAM's assertion of minimal differences in the number of transported passengers between the two variants is therefore deemed not entirely decisive. At the same time, the essence of the problem is obscured, namely that while Petrov primarily utilizes public transport in its existing form, the River requires significant reconstruction of public transport. This is a significant threat that KAM seems not to have considered at all!
 
It should be noted that KAM appears not to feel the need to consider the statements from independent experts from four universities regarding the feasibility study from a transport-economic perspective for the City of Brno, which agree on preferring the Petrov variant. The reasons are economic advantage and lower risk. According to these expert studies, the River variant will necessitate a 30-50% increase in the transport workload on trams during peak hours, particularly at intersections and nodes; according to the Brno Public Transport Company, "not even one additional tram fits in today." As a result, this means collapse. The only feasible solution to this risk bordering on certainty appears to be the north-south rail diameter, which is currently not accounted for in the financing, and the state of project preparation reflects this. There is not even agreement on where it should precisely lead or whether trains, trams, or some other medium should operate on it. No other realistic solutions have been proposed.
 
A MISHMASH?
 
In KAM's presentation, the construction of the River variant as a "greenfield" project (in reality at the site of the freight station) is heavily emphasized, whereas Petrov is likened to a difficult-to-implement mishmash. We do not understand why such emotionally charged criteria should decide on such a significant project, and we must point out that this approach is entirely contrary to current trends in the developed world, where there is a maximum connection and convergence of various forms of personal transport to enhance intermodality as much as possible. Railways are becoming an integrated part of urban transport. Besides these advantages, namely the saving of space and time for passengers, a multi-level solution also allows for greater capacity, including ensuring reserves for the future, when further development of public rail (and also freight railway) transport is anticipated. KAM also does not mention in its presentation the risks associated with limited capacity and the merging of passenger, freight transport, and high-speed rail in the River variant.
 
MORE ECOLOGICAL?
 
In conclusion, regarding KAM's questionable arguments, we mention the asserted greater ecological efficiency of the River variant. The reason is a larger number of parks. Here again, unfortunately, an impression of purpose-driven manipulation arises, as we do not presume that the expert team at KAM genuinely reduces the issue of urban environmental quality to the amount of greenery. Far more serious impacts on the quality of life for the entire city (not just the southern center area) can be expected from the increase in individual car traffic, which will cause the overall deterioration of public transportation competitiveness (VHD) in the River variant as demonstrated by the feasibility study. Possible elimination of these impacts is not addressed, and KAM does not discuss it in its presentations at all. As is known, Brno is already struggling with a number of transport issues associated with rising individual car traffic, the resolution of which is proceeding very slowly and laboriously. How can we expect the city to resolve further increases in issues caused by the deterioration of public transport any more efficiently?
 
We would also like to refer to the statements of certain politicians in the city leadership and others who, in response to the longer travel times for most public transport users, reply with excuses such as "passengers can manage those few extra minutes." We consider this approach utterly incompatible with the principles of sustainable development and contemporary urbanism, which fundamentally rests on shortening distances and supporting sustainable transport, not worsening it. In other words, any intervention in public transport or urban structure must always lead to improvement, not the other way around! To excuse the factual deterioration of public transport due to such significant intervention as the reconstruction of the ŽUB, especially at a cost of dozens of billions, is utter nonsense which we unequivocally reject. This principle is also contained in the city's strategic documents. The argument for sustainability, namely effective support for sustainable transport and increasing its competitiveness against individual car traffic, represents a far more significant criterion for us than the aforementioned arguments by the City Architect's Office.
 
PUBLIC OPINION
 
The city leadership evidently does not take public opinion into account, in contrast to the coalition agreement and the emphatic recommendations of the feasibility study. Whether it is the results of two ongoing referendums, which, although non-binding, indicated strong support for the station in the center, or the results of a public opinion survey, which also clearly speak in favor of the central station, which the city conducted for this purpose. The research from the Union of Passengers in Public Transport showed a completely decisive preference for the station in the center.
 
AGAIN ONE-SIDED PROPAGANDA
 
As mentioned, after the publication of the feasibility study, the city did not utilize the opportunity to genuinely inform its citizens through an appropriate campaign and paradoxically justifies its disregard for the results of the public opinion survey by the public’s lack of awareness. That the city leadership is not committed to balanced and objective information to the public is evident from the comprehensive description of the City Architect's Office's approach, where we can also mention the presentation of appealing visualizations only for the River variant. The topic was similarly presented in the municipal newsletter Metropolitan, thus exhausting the city's active communication with the public. This informational vacuum was successfully exploited by the Chamber of Commerce of South Moravia, which promotes the riverside station through several megaboards in different parts of the city. The public is once again inadequately and one-sidedly informed.
 
NEW CITY AVENUE
 
That said, to the fundamental procedural flaws that we believe may be and likely will be a serious risk for the successful preparation and implementation of the ŽUB reconstruction, we now detail two fundamental shortcomings of the River variant that were not emphasized above and that pose serious risks for the project, yet are persistently ignored or downplayed.
 
The first is the already mentioned so-called new city avenue, the planned capacity trolleybus line connecting the new station by the river with Drobného Street. Although the removal of this project from the zoning plan of the City of Brno is already in progress, and the City Architect's Office is also examining its shortening or complete cancellation, the feasibility study still counts on it in both options. When alerted to this fact, KAM argues that the difference in anticipated daily capacity between both options is small, and at the same time, without further justification, states that both options can do without this trolleybus line. However, it ignores the diametrically different handling of the station in options A and B. While option B lies on an existing and functional primary urban transport hub, option A requires a radical reorganization of public transport. Because it is not possible to distribute all passengers from the relocated station through the existing transport hub due to limited capacity, the north-south trolleybus line is essential for the River option. Even though it is already clear that this line will either not be built at all or will only be partially realized (it is not realistically possible to fully achieve this concerning unresolved property-legal relations within the stated time frame), the City of Brno prioritizes this contingent option without any available alternative solutions. This is a completely irresponsible action, which represents a fundamental error in urban and transport planning.
 
Arguments arise that part of the passengers will alight at so-called intermediate stops in Černovice or Židenice; however, this option does not fully compensate for the problem stated above and may lead to overloads of already exhausted capacities in radial lines due to the absence of targets in those areas. The entire problem of the new city avenue is thus completely unresolved, and the feasibility study mentions it as a significant risk: “Another potential negative impact could result from the unsuccessful realization of the trolleybus line, which is part of the project for the construction of the new city avenue. In the outlook, the operation of trolleybus lines along this new line from the main station is considered, where these lines provide a portion of transport for passengers from the main station to selected locations in the city of Brno. In the event of an unsuccessful realization of this intention, the functionality of the project would be impaired. ... The risk of the unsuccessful realization of the new city avenue would have a significant negative impact on the functioning of the transport system in the City of Brno regardless of the specific solution of the ŽUB. However, compared to variants B and Without the project, this risk's impact is higher for variant A, as in the case of the first two mentioned variants, passengers have more favorable alternative connections available via other public transport lines than in variant A.” How is it possible that such a fundamental problem is not taken into account by the leadership of the City of Brno in its decision-making?
 
CAPACITY CORRIDOR
 
The transfer of passenger rail transport to the existing freight corridor and its capacity doubling has significant effects on the residential neighborhood it traverses and is one of the reasons why the zoning decision for the relocated station remains invalid. The reason is the non-fulfillment of hygiene limits for this structure, which is to replace the existing double-track railway embankment with a quadruple track and vertical walls. The merging of freight and passenger transport, ironically contrary to current European transport trends, will cause more of an accumulation of all railway operations in this location, resulting in approximately two-minute train frequencies. An increase is also expected for both freight and passenger trains. Even though the city's efforts to eliminate noise are evident, due to the proximity of residential buildings, it will likely be quite challenging, and there will also be a decrease in lighting parameters for the given residential houses. Any alternative solutions (e.g., routing in a tunnel on pillars) or compensation for residents, which are not currently being considered, will undoubtedly negatively affect the construction costs, which is one of the main arguments for the River variant. Despite the awareness of this serious problem, the city is taking no steps to mitigate this risk.
 
UNFAVORABLE FORECAST IN CONCLUSION
 
In our opinion, the decision-making concerning such a fundamental issue as the reconstruction of the ŽUB, which will significantly influence the shape of the entire city of Brno, is occurring disproportionately swiftly and without sufficient contemplation. The claim of alleged acceleration by just a few years as a reason for one of the variants is baseless in the context of the significance and lifespan of this structure. Brno is long suffering consequences from the unilateral pushing of one option. If we had been sufficiently farsighted, we could have embarked on the path of fair and open evaluation of all realistic options, similar to Western metropolises, twenty-five years ago, and today a new station could probably already exist.
 
Although reluctantly, we are under the circumstances forced to anticipate further stagnation in the development of the ŽUB reconstruction plan. The problems and threats outlined above, if not addressed promptly, will likely fundamentally impact the project preparation. Given the evident strong public opposition and the lack of a fair campaign, we can expect the continuation of civic initiatives against the project of the relocated station within the framework of the prevailing legislation. Given the procedural errors, deficiencies in the project, and inconsistency of the city’s procedures with the recommendations of the feasibility study and the conditions for EU funding, justified public complaints and subsequent complications with project financing can be expected. The today-praised advantage of faster construction is, in our opinion, entirely unrealistic within the stated timeframe, and based on past experiences, further delays or even temporary halts in project preparation can be anticipated.
 
We believe this is a great loss for Brno and that it is further distancing itself from successful modern metropolises instead of trying to get closer to them. Therefore, we would like to appeal to you, the current representatives of the City of Brno, to carefully consider how you will approach the city’s decision regarding the future of the railway node and the entire city.
 
Sincerely,
 
Ing. arch. Petr Hýl
Ing. arch. Robert Sedlák
Ing. arch. Martin Klenovský
Ing. et Ing. arch. Filip Slezák
doc. Ing. arch. Karel Havliš
Prof. Ing. arch. Ivan Ruller
doc. Ing. arch. Jiří Oplatek
Ing. arch. Radek Suchánek, Ph.D.
Ing. arch. et Mgr. Roman Čerbák
Ing. arch. Michal Veselý
Ing. arch. Gabriel Kurtis
Ing. arch. Dagmar Sitařová
Ing. arch. Aleš Stuchlík
Mgr. Petra Hlaváčková
Mgr. Šárka Svobodová
MgA. Jakub Kořínek
Ing. Jakub Kutílek